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# *Hospitality Investment Strategies in Greece*

February 2016

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# *Executive summary*

## **The market**

- Greece is a significant global tourist destination, with 25 mn arrivals in 2015, up from almost 22 mn in 2014
- Tourism is not, by and large, dependent on Greek GDP, but its direct contribution exceeds 7%
- The hospitality industry has been growing fast and systematically in the last three years, but it is not particularly internationally competitive, mainly due to price
- In 2014, tourists spend about €590 per journey, with an average stay of 8.4 days, yielding about €13bn income
- There are about 9,745 hotels with approximately 405k rooms and 781k beds in the country, mainly concentrated (85%) in Crete, South Aegean, Central Macedonia and the Ionian islands
- Greek hospitality is mostly based on small 2\* hotels (4,198 hotels), while 4\* and 5\* hotels account for only 17% of the total number
- There are only 367 hotels with more than 300 beds, representing 4% of the total number of hotels and 25% of bed capacity
- The hotel industry is fragmented with the average unit size in our sample at 247 beds. On average, each hotel company has only 1.5 units, while one company/one hotel account for about 47% of sample hotels. There are 87 Greek hotel chains and 6 non Greek hotel operators
- About 38% of all hotel companies are highly competitive with systematic growth, good profitability and little debt
- Most of the debt hotel industry (€4bn) is concentrated in the Zombie and Grey groups facing servicing issue. Hotels in Zombie categories appear overinvested and overcapitalised with negative return on equity
- The hospitality industry, will benefit from restructuring/refinancing about € 2bn over a reasonable time horizon, to restore the balance with operational profitability

- Hotels are unevenly distributed in Greece. Five main destinations account for 84% of all capacity and about 93% of revenues and profits. The majority of tourists are attracted to destinations, where the percentage of 4\* and 5\* hotels bed capacity is more than 25%
- The hotel industry is fragmented with the average unit size in our sample at 247 beds. On average, each hotel company has only 1.5 units, while one company/one hotel account for about 47% of sample hotels. There are 87 Greek hotel chains and 6 non Greek hotel operators
- For the upgrading of the tourism product around € 1.6bn will be spent up to 2022

### **Drivers of Economic Performance**

- Hospitality economics are determined by destination, unit size and class and significantly influenced by the quality of management
- There are significant differences in performance between main and lesser destinations, with capacity problems at peak at main destinations and a lot of slack in lesser ones
- Higher star hotels tend to have better revenue and EBITDA per bed as well as margins than lower star hotels
- Unit size has a limited impact on hotel economics and does not appear that larger hotels have on average better financial performance than smaller ones
- The quality of management and the overall competitiveness of a hotel is the single most important determinant of value, given the other parameters

### **Geopolitical Developments**

- The conditions in Middle East, Turkey and North Africa and the improving, relative to them, competitiveness of Greek hospitality, are supporting the continuing growth hypothesis
- Growth in tourist arrivals could be only halted by a global or European recession or major political events in Greece

## Investment Strategies

- The Greek hotel M&A market is almost dormant. There are at least 225 hotels currently on offer, the majority at main destinations and asking prices almost 50% higher than the imputed equity values per bed.
- Very few transactions get to be completed every year and vast majority are of small size
- There are three strategies and a doubtful strategy for hospitality investments:
  - **add capacity** at main destinations through unutilised building permits
  - **upgrade hotels** to the next class
  - **develop lesser destinations** through acquisition of many hotels at one of them
  - **Zombie hotel acquisition is a doubtful strategy** with only few exceptions
- The most promising strategy in terms of value potential appears to be **lesser destination development** followed by capacity enhancement, with hotel upgrading at the bottom
- In the context of the capacity and upgrading strategies there are at main destinations, 221 Star and 153 Grey 5\* and 4\* and 3\* hotels to be considered for acquisition at international EBITDA multiples
- At lesser destinations, where the privatisation of 14 regional airports could boost demand, there are 57 hotels, that could be acquired to develop specific destination
- The current structure of the industry along with its mild relative competitiveness and its underlying economics do not facilitate large scale transactions and consequently fast consolidation

Star/ Grey  
5\* - 4\* - 3\*/2\*/1\*

Add Capacity			
Group	Value multiples (x)		
	5*	4*	3*/2*/1*
Star	1.6	1.7	1.6
Grey	1.6	1.5	1.6

Up to 605 hotels, at main destinations

Star/ Grey  
4\* - 3\*/2\*/1\*

Upgrade hotels		
Group	Value multiples (x)	
	From 4* --> 5*	From 3* --> >4*
Star	1.6	1.2
Grey	1.4	1.1

Up to 476 hotels

Star/ Grey  
5\* - 4\* - 3\*/2\*/1\*

Develop Lesser Destinations			
Group	Value multiples (x)		
	5*	4*	3*/2*/1*
Star	3.7	2.0	1.6
Grey	1.8	1.8	1.5




Up to 57 hotels at lesser destinations

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# *Hotel Competitiveness*

**During the crisis the profitability of the hotel industry was stable, with signs of improvement for hotels with annual revenue in excess of € 1mn p.a.**

- Sample revenues increased to € 2.8bn in 2013, marking the highest increase since 2008(12.2%)
- Gross fixed assets rose by 5.8% p.a. within 2008-2013 reaching € 16bn, steadily increasing
- Historically EBITDA decreased by 12.2% (2008-2012), a significant positive change is evident (45%) in 2013
- Total debt stood at € 4.8bn in 2013, 11.6% higher than 2008, but 2% lower than 2012
- Average Net Debt/EBITDA, as a measure of debt sustainability, dropped from 9.2x in 2012 to 6.2x in 2013
- Capital employed remains underremunerated, while on average hotel balance sheets are reasonably well capitalized, with Net Debt to Capital Employed remaining constant at about 40% throughout the period



**Hotel companies showed an improvement in competitiveness from 2009 to 2013, with more than 67% retaining or improving their relative position**

**238** hotel companies  
(32% of total ) moved  
**downwards**

**143** hotel companies  
(19% of total) remained in  
the **same Group**

**364** hotel companies  
(49% of total) moved  
**upwards**

	2009/2013	5	4	3	2	1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	Total 2013
<b>Star</b>	5	1	4	3	1	1	3	2	0	1	4	<b>20</b>
	4	0	15	5	7	5	14	5	9	9	9	<b>78</b>
	3	0	15	18	4	4	46	11	20	13	18	<b>149</b>
	2	1	2	0	1	0	3	0	5	0	1	<b>13</b>
	1	0	1	5	2	12	4	10	3	14	7	<b>58</b>
	-1	2	7	6	7	3	26	8	26	10	7	<b>102</b>
	-2	0	3	4	0	5	15	16	4	25	17	<b>89</b>
	-3	0	4	4	1	1	15	1	12	0	3	<b>41</b>
	-4	0	0	5	0	3	9	17	8	17	19	<b>78</b>
<b>Zombie</b>	-5	1	5	14	1	3	26	7	13	22	25	<b>117</b>
	<b>Total 2009</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>745</b>
	<b>% Change</b>	<b>300%</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>133%</b>	<b>-46%</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>-37%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>-59%</b>	<b>-30%</b>	<b>6%</b>	

- Around half of the hotel companies moved to a higher category compared to 32% that moved downwards
- Since 2009, 92 hotel companies turned to Zombies (-5) to 2013, and 19 companies turned to Stars (5), whilst 19% remained in the same Group



## Hotel Competitiveness

**37% of the hotel companies, representing 32% of bed capacity, belong to Star groups, with only 10% of the bed capacity in trapped Zombie hotel companies**




## The typical hotel company tends to be small with annual revenues between €2.1mn to €4.8mn



\*€ mn

Typical Company	Stars				Grey		Zombies			
	5	4	3	2	1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Revenue (€ in mn)	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.8	4.5	4.0	4.8	3.9	3.8	2.1
Cagr '08 - '13	13%	11%	8%	12%	1%	10%	-1%	8%	-4%	-13%
EBITDA (€ in mn)	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.3	0.3	0.4	-0.2
EBITDA margin	35%	33%	32%	29%	31%	29%	28%	9%	11%	-8%
EBT (€ in mn)	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.0	-0.1	-1.4	-1.0	-0.8
Gross Fixed Assets (€ in mn)	9.7	14.9	15.9	14.1	23.2	22.5	27.6	33.5	28.8	17.4
ROI	12%	8%	7%	8%	6%	5%	5%	1%	1%	-1%
Capital Employed (€ in mn)	4.0	11.0	10.0	8.3	11.6	16.2	20.1	22.6	23.0	10.8
ROCE	22%	6%	6%	4%	6%	3%	3%	-4%	-2%	-5%
Net Debt (€ in mn)	-0.3	0.1	1.6	-0.3	4.4	7.5	12.3	8.2	12.9	4.5
Net Debt/EBITDA	-0.2	0.1	1.4	-0.3	3.1	6.5	9.1	24.6	30.5	-28.0
# of Employees	6	19	9	19	9	14	18	32	29	40
# of Hotels	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.2	1.6	1.3
# of Beds	319	323	388	292	557	380	582	387	473	301

- As we move from Group 5 to Group -5, for a typical hotel company:
  - revenue growth drops
  - EBITDA margin on average drops from above 30% to less than 10%
  - revenue is slightly higher with the exception of real Zombies
  - profitability declines to below zero levels
  - gross fixed assets increase considerably, doubling across Zombies
  - significantly more capital is employed
  - more staff is employed
  - net debt increases disproportionately, downstream of Group 2
- In summary, Star hotel companies use less fixed assets and employ capital more productively than Zombie companies



# Hotel groups on average tend to be as competitive as the single hotel companies



Source: PwC sample and calculations



- 223 out of 531 single hotel companies (42%) is classified as Zombie, while 35% and 23% are Star and Grey respectively
- Companies with 3, 6 and 9 hotels are in general Stars

- Operational profitability is on average the same across hotel numbers per company
- Return on Investment and Return on Capital Employed tend to grow with the number of hotels in a Group, but sample sizes are very small for comfort

**For the refinancing of the hospitality industry, over a reasonable time horizon, banks must...**

**...write off or heavily restructure about €0.6bn (12% of sample loans) and release the assets, mostly held by Zombies**

**... restructure/refinance about € 2bn (41% of sample loans) to restore the balance with operational profitability**



### **Summary**

- Overall, the hotel industry has retained and slightly improved its competitiveness during the crisis
- More than one third of the hotels are truly competitive, in the Star groups
- A small percentage (12%) of companies are Zombies, with trapped debt of around €600mn
- The typical hotel firm is small with competitive companies being in general smaller than non competitive
- Zombie hotels tend to be bigger and significantly less productive than Star hotels in the 4\* and 5\* categories
- Hotel companies appear overinvested as we move down the competitiveness scale, however generally with sound capital structures
- Hotel groups tend to be as competitive as single hotel companies
- About 240 hotel companies will need to refinance approximately €2bn of debt, with 114 of them, representing €1bn, being profitable and growing. About €600mn are trapped loans

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






# *Hotel Performance Drivers*

***Destination, class, unit size, and the quality of management determine hotel economics***

- Hotel economics appear to be dependent mainly on three variables:
  - **destination**
  - **class**
  - **size of unit**
- The quality of management also affects performance within each grouping, reflecting on its overall competitiveness
- Destination, or location at a more granular level, affects the rates earned per room, the average occupancy and to an extent capital cost because of land prices
- Class determines in the main the average rates charged, as well as the capital costs incurred in construction
- The size of the hotel unit influences the operating cost and the non room component of the revenue
- There is an important distinction in financial performance between operating profitability (EBITDA margin) and return on capital invested (ROI)

## Five destinations account for 84% of all capacity

- Central Macedonia, Crete, Ionian Islands, South Aegean and Attica account for **84% of hotels, 91% of revenue, 95% of EBITDA, 86% of fixed assets and 88% of net debt**
- Two destinations, Crete and Southern Aegean, have more than **40% of all capacity**
- Average **EBITDA margin** is around 23%, with Attica lagging
- Average **Return on Investment** is fairly robust at around 5%, with the exception of Attica



Revenue/bed

EBITDA/bed

Gross Fixed Assets/bed


EBITDA margin

ROI



## Lesser destinations show a lower performance





- **Eight destinations** (East Macedonia and Thrace, Northern Aegean, Western Greece, Western Macedonia, Epirus, Peloponnese and Central Greece) have less than 35 hotels each and in total account for less than 15% of all beds
- Revenue and EBITDA per bed figures for lesser destination are on average 31% and 36% lower than those for the main destinations, whilst Gross Fixed Assets are roughly at the same level
- Average EBIDA margin and Return on Investment show some variance between lesser destinations, and are on average 3.5pp and 1.5pp lower correspondingly than in the main destinations
- Main destinations tend to be served by larger 5 and 4 Star hotels than lesser destinations









***Zombies tend to be concentrated in lesser destinations, with the marked exception of Attica***

<b>Destination</b>	<b>% Zombies</b>	<b>% Grey</b>	<b>% Stars</b>
<i>South Aegean</i>	26%	30%	44%
<i>Crete</i>	27%	22%	51%
<i>Attica</i>	60%	20%	19%
<i>Ionian Islands</i>	29%	20%	51%
<i>Central Macedonia</i>	55%	18%	27%
<i>Peloponnese</i>	61%	28%	11%
<i>Thessaly</i>	57%	10%	33%
<i>North Aegean</i>	47%	33%	20%
<i>Central Greece</i>	75%	17%	8%
<i>Western Greece</i>	64%	14%	21%
<i>East Macedonia and Thrace</i>	53%	26%	21%
<i>Epirus</i>	60%	10%	30%
<i>Western Macedonia</i>	50%	25%	25%
<b>Total</b>	<b>41%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>36%</b>

# There are indications of under capacity at the main destinations




**Performance and operational characteristics differ per Star category, with high Star hotels underperforming lower Star hotels in terms of profitability**



**300- beds hotels, seem to perform slightly better in terms of operating profitability than 300+ bed hotels, but show very little difference on return on investment**


Revenue/Bed (€k)

Avg. difference.: € 1.9k




EBITDA/Bed (€k)

Avg. difference.: € 0.6k




EBITDA margin

Avg. difference.: € 2.0pps




Gross Fixed Asset/Bed

Avg. difference.: € 8.0k




Net Debt/Bed

Avg. difference.: € 0.8k




ROI


Avg. difference.: € 0.2pps



**Primarily class and secondarily the unit size determine profitability at any given destination with significant distance between main and lesser destination**




$\ln(\text{EBITDA/Bed}) = -1.72 + 0.11 \ln(\text{Revenue}) + 0.77 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$   
 $\ln(\text{EBITDA/Bed}) = -1.16 + 0.07 \ln(\text{Revenue}) + 0.73 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$   
 $\ln(\text{EBITDA/Bed}) = -1.27 + 0.15 \ln(\text{Revenue}) + 0.58 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$




$\ln(\text{EBITDA/Bed}) = -7.40 + 0.37 \ln(\text{Revenue}) + 0.95 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$   
 $\ln(\text{EBITDA/Bed}) = 0.18 \ln(\text{Revenue}) + 0.44 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$   
 $\ln(\text{EBITDA/Bed}) = -3.32 + 0.18 \ln(\text{Revenue}) + 0.72 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$

- Star, Grey, and Zombie hotel performance is driven in general by the same variables, but there are systematic differences in their performance
- EBITDA/Bed at main destinations is strongly dependent on class and secondarily on size, with marked differences between main and lesser destinations
- Star hotels in lesser destinations perform considerably better than all others
- Grey hotels in lesser destinations tend to be more comparable to Zombie hotels
- In general, extra investment in a hotel or capacity addition are rewarded by diminishing increases in EBITDA/bed

**Depending on unit size and classes, different types of hotel emerge as most profitable in terms of return on investment**



$$\ln(\text{ROI}) = 0.11 \ln(\text{Revenue}) - 0.42 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$$
$$\ln(\text{ROI}) = -2.18 + 0.15 \ln(\text{Revenue}) - 0.29 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$$
$$\ln(\text{ROI}) = -1.08 + 0.09 \ln(\text{Revenue}) - 0.29 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$$



$$\ln(\text{ROI}) = 3.12 + 0.15 \ln(\text{Revenue}) - 0.77 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$$
$$\ln(\text{ROI}) = -2.84 + 0.27 \ln(\text{Revenue}) - 0.41 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$$
$$\ln(\text{ROI}) = -4.50 + 0.07 \ln(\text{Revenue}) - 0.02 \ln(\text{GFA/Bed})$$

- The performance differences are greater in lesser than for the main destinations
- At the main destinations, 5\* hotels and 1\*/2\*/3\* hotels demonstrate similar performance, while 4\* hotels perform about 2 pps lower
- Within the lesser destination cluster, 5\* hotels have the best return on investment, comparable to main destination hotels. Between the other two classes, for less than 200 beds 1\*/2\*/3\*, hotels have better returns, with 4\* hotels emerging after that mark

## **Summary**

- Destination, class, unit size, and the quality of management determine hotel economics
- Five destinations account for 84% of all capacity
- Lesser destinations which cover 16% of capacity show a lower performance than the main destinations
- Zombies tend to be concentrated in lesser destinations, with the marked exception of Attica
- There are indications of under capacity at the main destinations
- Performance and operational characteristics differ per Star category, with high Star hotels underperforming lower Star hotels in terms of profitability
- 300- beds hotels, seem to perform slightly better in terms of operational profitability than 300+ bed hotels, but show very little difference on return on investment
- Primarily class and secondarily the unit size determine profitability at any given destination with significant distance between main and lesser destination
- Depending on unit size and classes, different types of hotel emerge as most profitable in terms of return on investment



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# *Investment Strategies*

## ***The investment context***

- Tourism has been growing consistently since 2011 and is not, by and large, driven by Greek GDP
- The conditions in Middle East, Turkey and North Africa and the improving, relative to them, competitiveness of Greek hospitality, are supporting the continuing growth hypothesis
- Growth in tourist arrivals could be only halted by a global or European recession or major political events in Greece
- There are 754 hotel companies 1,129 hotels with revenues more than €1mn p.a.; only 367 of the hotels have 300+ beds, whilst less than 60 of the companies are trapped Zombies
- Hospitality economics are driven by **destination**, **class** and **unit size** and strongly influenced by the quality of management
- There are about 240 Zombie hotel companies in fairly good shape carrying about €2 bn of excess, but refianaceable, loans
- About €1.6bn of investment is planned to improve the tourism infrastructure in the period up to 2020
- There has been very little visible M&A activity in the hospitality industry in recent years, with very few and only one sizeable transactions recently

**There are at least 225 hotels currently on offer, with asking prices per bed considerably higher than the imputed equity value per bed**

Destinations	No of Hotels	Asking Price (€ k)	Average Asking Price (€ k/hotel)	Beds	Beds/Hotel	Average Asking Price/bed (€ k)	Average estimated Equity Price/bed (€ k)	Estimated Equity Value/bed (% Asking Price/bed)
South Aegean	49	282,420	5,764	5,992	122	47.1	27.8	58.9%
Crete	24	479,150	19,965	9,122	380	52.5	27.0	51.3%
Ionian Islands	35	337,050	9,630	9,382	268	35.9	18.4	51.3%
Central Macedonia	26	273,950	10,537	6,607	254	41.5	23.0	55.5%
Attica	42	327,920	7,808	6,371	152	51.5	16.5	32.1%
<b>Main destinations sub total</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>1,700,490</b>	<b>9,662</b>	<b>37,474</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>45.4</b>	<b>24.8</b>	<b>54.8%</b>
Western Greece	3	15,000	5,000	518	173	29.0	18.4	63.5%
Western Macedonia	1	1,800	1,800	100	100	18.0	27.8	154.6%
Epirus	2	4,000	2,000	189	95	21.2	16.0	75.5%
Thessaly	4	21,200	5,300	486	121	43.6	15.6	35.8%
Peloponnese	16	92,200	5,763	3,718	232	24.8	5.8	23.5%
Central Greece	23	198,280	8,621	6,955	302	28.5	6.8	23.9%
<b>Lesser destinations sub total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>332,480</b>	<b>6,785</b>	<b>11,966</b>	<b>244</b>	<b>27.8</b>	<b>11.21</b>	<b>40.3%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>2,032,970</b>	<b>9,035</b>	<b>49,440</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>41.1</b>	<b>23.21</b>	<b>56.4%</b>

Source: PwC research

- Hotels on offer are concentrated in the main destinations (78%)
- There are typically small units with about 220 beds on average priced at €45k/bed for main destination or €28k/bed for lesser destinations
- The asking prices per bed in the main destinations are 63% higher than in the lesser destinations
- The typical equity value for a hotel at each destination is between about 45% lower than the average asking price, with the difference being more salient (60%) for lesser destinations

## There are only three investment strategies (1/2)

- **Strategy A: Add capacity at main destinations by acquiring hotels (up to 605 hotels) with immediate expansion potential**
  - capacity in certain locations of the five main destinations is short of the potential demand
  - to cope with the current trend of incoming tourists, hotels need to expand and possibly new units will be built at certain locations
  - when new units are combined in locations with existing ones, the economics improve markedly
  - investments in upgrading and renovation are also due after years of underinvestment
  - profitability improvement tend to be bigger for Star hotels
  - typical hotel EV will range from €46k to €23k per bed
- **Strategy B: Acquire and upgrade hotel units to the next class (up to 476 hotels)**
  - upgrading to the next class will increase room rates at the expense of the incremental investment necessary and higher operating cost
  - upgrading increases both operational profitability and return on investment
  - the profitability improvement tends to be bigger for Star hotels at main destinations
  - typical hotel EV will range from €37k to €24k per bed

Star/ Grey  
5\* - 4\* - 3\*/2\*/1\*

Add capacity			
Group	Value multiples (x)		
	5*	4*	3*/2*/1*
Star	1.6	1.7	1.6
Grey	1.6	1.5	1.6

Up to 605 hotels, at main destinations

Star/ Grey  
4\* - 3\*/2\*/1\*

Upgrade		
Group	Value multiples (x)	
	4*-->5*	3*-->4*
Star	1.6	1.2
Grey	1.4	1.1

Up to 476 hotels

## There are only three investment strategies (2/2)

- **Strategy C: Develop lesser destinations by acquiring a number of hotels at the same destination (57 hotels in total)**

- at lesser location hotels tend to underperform
- acquiring a number of hotels at a lesser destination and marketing them aggressively will improve their operating economics
- hotels for acquisitions could be Stars or Greys, and occasionally Zombies, in the 5\* and 4\* classes
- developing a new destination could prove expensive and may require state support for the upgrade of infrastructure and for marketing
- there are about 20 hotels in a number of lesser destinations that could be acquired cheaper than the cost of investment
- the most relevant lesser destination for this strategy are East Macedonia and Thrace, Epirus and Western Greece
- typical hotel EV will range from €70k to €12k per bed

- **Zombie acquisition is a doubtful strategy (only 54 hotels)**

- The acquisition cost plus the upgrade cost plus the repositioning and marketing costs could prove greater, smaller or equal to the market value, rendering the process uncertain

Star/ Grey  
5\* - 4\* - 3\*/2\*/1\*

Develop lesser destinations			
Group	Value multiples (x)		
	5*	4*	3*/2*/1*
Star	3.7	2.0	1.6
Grey	1.8	1.8	1.5

Up to 57 hotels at lesser destinations

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# *Conclusions*

## ***Greek hospitality: A land of opportunities?***

- Tourism is growing consistently since 2011 and it is not by and large driven by Greek GDP. The tourism industry is mildly competitive
- The hospitality industry is fragmented with small scale hotel companies
- Hospitality economics are determined by **destination**, **unit size** and **class** and influenced by the quality of management
- There are at least 225 hotels currently on offer, at asking prices 77% on average higher than the typical equity value for the hotel cluster. However very few hotel transactions are completed every year
- There are three strategies and a no-strategy for hospitality investments:
  - **add capacity** at main destinations through unutilised building permits
  - **upgrade hotels** to the next class
  - **develop lesser destinations** through acquisition of many hotels at one of them
  - **Zombie acquisition is a doubtful strategy** with only few exceptions
- The most promising strategy in terms of value potential appears to be **lesser destination development** followed by capacity enhancement, with hotel upgrading at the bottom
- In the context of these strategies there are at main destinations, 221 Star and 153 Grey 5\* and 4\* hotels to be considered for acquisition at international EBITDA multiples
- At lesser destinations, where the privatisation of 14 regional airports could boost demand, there are 57 hotels, 18 of which could be acquired relatively cheap against the capital already invested
- The current structure of the industry along with its mild relative competitiveness and its underlying economics do not facilitated large scale transactions and consequently fast consolidation

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